

**Föderaler Wettbewerb vs. opportunistische
Transgression:
Empirische Evidenz zum Verhalten
der Ministerpräsident:innen während der Covid-
Pandemie.**

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STRUCTURE

- 1 Literature Review
- 2 Yardstick competition
- 3 Data
- 4 Model
- 5 Results
- 6 Conclusion

LITERATURE REVIEW

FEDERALISM

Federalism as political laboratories: Yardstick competition

- Political aspirations fosters policy innovation (Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2006))
- State incumbents act as copycats after evaluating the first-mover states' performance (Strumpf, 2002; Brooks, 2007)
- 'Campfire Tale' (Tyler and Gerken, 2022)

Transgression: Opportunistic behaviour of savvy incumbents (Bednar, 2009, Ch. 3)

- Federalist competition can fail if constituents are tempted to exploit the federal union for their own benefit
- Because competition favours illustrious governments, it makes experimentation and self-responsibility perilous for feeble governments
- Blurred jurisdiction and shared competencies allow incumbents with poor performance to deflect responsibility for errors

Yardstick competition

Application

Low performing prime ministers shift responsibility upon the federal government



Minimise competition in order to mask their bad crisis management



Bad politicians try to increase their chance to succeed in the long run

- Covid-19 pandemic
 - ✓ Symmetric shock for all German states
 - ✓ Public focus on prime ministers
 - ✓ No change of prime ministers/federal government

DATA EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

Variable	Meaning	Variable	Meaning
F_{it}	Federalism Index	C_{it}	Covid-19 indicator
$i \in \{1, \dots, 16\}$	German State	t	Time
fin_i	Financial Strength	v_{it}	Vaccination rate
a_i	General Attitude		

$$\text{logit}[F_{it}] = fin_i + a_i + a_i fin_i + v_{it} + \alpha_{it} C_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Data

Dependent and independent variable


Federalism index

- More than 900 classified statements




Deviation of the seven-day incidence per state from the national average

- <0: high performing prime minister




DATA

GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS FEDERALISM



DATA FEDERALISM INDEX VS. GENERAL ATTITUDE



Model

Multinomial logistic regression

Logit regression analysis

- Probability of the outcome variable given the independent variable
 - Increases/decreases continuously
- Non-linear likelihood function
- Logistic distribution represents these characteristics.

$$\ln \frac{\pi(x)}{1 - \pi(x)} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x$$

Cumulative logit model with proportional odds assumption

- Compare probability of a less or equal outcome of the dependent variable to the probability of a higher outcome
- Identical effect parameter which indicates the log odds

RESULTS

ODDS RATIO

Odds ratio

Wave	First	Second	Third
7dayinc_dev	0.9662	1.0044	1.0086
att_t_fed	1.1718	38.5089	41.6490
vaccination_rate	1.0228	0.8002	0.9414
FKM21	0.9968	1.0767	1.1036
fin_att	3.5802	0.9659	0.9643

Source: Own calculations

Interpretation

- For prime ministers with a 100 point higher 7DI deviation the odds of being in $ai > 1$ instead of $ai = 1$ is 1.5512 times (2nd wave) resp. 2.3545 (3rd) times that of a state with a baseline deviation.
- Baseline deviation: Lowest deviation per wave

RESULTS

POSSIBLE INTERPRETATION

First wave

- Results are in accordance with the findings of Schnabel and Hegele (2021)

Second and third wave

- The Covid19-pandemic has caused politicians with above-average 7DI to support and even claim for more regulation and action on the federal level
- Second and third wave: low performing prime ministers try to shift responsibility

CONCLUSION

The desire for decisive, unequivocal leadership at the top of a unified hierarchy is a well-known response to threats.

In times of uncertainty, policy heterogeneity is required to iteratively achieve sound decisions.

Federal encroaching under the 'coordination' label can be an impediment to policy innovation.

Empirical evidence for strategic transgression by abdication.

Little backing for blurred and obfuscated jurisdictions (German case).

Thank you for your attention!

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APPENDIX


STATEMENTS-EXAMPLE

*„Wir haben uns deshalb hier mit breiter Mehrheit auf unseren MV-Weg verständigt.“
(Manuela Schwesig)*

*„Der Bund steht in der Verantwortung, dies zu verbessern.“
(Markus Söder)*

APPENDIX

CONTROL VARIABLE ATTITUDE TOWARDS FEDERALISM



1: Substantial criticism:
Stronger federalism and more independence

4: Substantial criticism:
Joint decision making and transfer of competences

APPENDIX

OTHER CONTROL VARIABLES

Financial strength

- States enjoy spending and debt autonomy
- States enjoy no tax autonomy
- (Mandatory) financial equalization
- Significant harmonisation
- Index of financial capacity

Economic strength

- Differing living standard and industry structures
- Manufacturing sector is the strongest hit during the pandemic
- Economic support measures > one trillion
- Share of manufacturing sector on the gross value added per state

Vaccination rate

- Included in second and third wave estimation
- Based on cumulative number of people who received all doses prescribed by the vaccination protocol

RESULTS

PROBABILITIES

Probabilities of the conditional effect

First wave

Inter-group-comparison: Prime ministers prefer individual action or support decisions made on the federal level over individual action of others and ask for more regulation

Intra-group-comparison: Good performing prime ministers are more likely to support decisions (jointly) made on the federal level

Second wave

Inter-group-comparison: All prime ministers are most likely to promote joint decision making

Intra-group-comparison: All governments are willing to make joint decisions/transfer competences, bad performing governments are more likely than good performing governments to favour central decision making.


Third wave

Inter-group-comparison: All prime ministers are most likely to promote individual decision making

Intra-group-comparison: Bad performing governments are one percent more likely to prefer individual decision making

APPENDIX INCLUDING BERLIN

BERLIN SPECIFICATION THREE



Source: Own calculations

INTERPRETATION

- Including Berlin does not change the pattern of the results
- Reasonable to assume attitude towards federalism between three and four
- Significance of the estimates decreases the later the wave and the higher the attitude towards federalism

APPENDIX

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL LOG ODDS

wave	First β (SE)	Second β (SE)	Third β (SE)
sevendayincidence_dev	-0.0343 (0.0138)*	0.0044 (0.0021)*	0.0085 (0.0051)
att_t_fed	0.1586 (1.4325)	3.6509 (0.2650)***	3.7293 (0.4142)***
FKM21	0.0225 (0.0324)	0.0739 (0.0029)***	0.0986 (0.0058)***
fin_att	-0.0032 (0.0135)	-0.0347 (0.0037)***	-0.0363 (0.0064)***
1 2	1.2754 (3.6265)	7.2047 (0.1051)***	9.6515 (0.1501)***
2 3	1.4894 (3.6268)	7.5021 (0.1172)***	9.8478 (0.1619)***
3 4	4.2235 (3.6373)	9.9297 (0.1842)***	11.9703 (0.2699)***
vaccination_rate		-0.2229 (0.1467)	-0.0604 (0.0408)
AIC	483.8629	871.4974	434.2166
BIC	507.6501	902.8915	460.2766
Log Likelihood	-234.9315	-427.7487	-209.1083
Deviance	469.8629	855.4974	418.2166
Num. obs.	221	374	192

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Source: Own calculations

APPENDIX

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL PROBABILITIES

incidence group	probability	SE	conf.low	conf.high	response.level	wave
2.00	0.30	3.61	0.00	1.00	1	first
3.00	0.44	3.66	0.00	1.00	1	first
2.00	0.05	3.61	0.00	0.98	2	first
3.00	0.05	3.66	0.00	0.99	2	first
2.00	0.54	3.61	0.00	1.00	3	first
3.00	0.44	3.66	0.00	1.00	3	first
2.00	0.11	3.61	0.00	0.99	4	first
3.00	0.06	3.66	0.00	0.99	4	first

incidence group	probability	SE	conf.low	conf.high	response.level	wave
1.00	0.38	0.22	0.29	0.49	1	second
2.00	0.32	0.14	0.27	0.38	1	second
3.00	0.27	0.21	0.19	0.35	1	second
4.00	0.22	0.36	0.12	0.36	1	second
5.00	0.17	0.51	0.07	0.36	1	second
1.00	0.07	0.22	0.05	0.11	2	second
2.00	0.07	0.14	0.05	0.09	2	second
3.00	0.06	0.21	0.04	0.09	2	second
4.00	0.05	0.36	0.03	0.10	2	second
5.00	0.05	0.51	0.02	0.12	2	second
1.00	0.45	0.22	0.34	0.56	3	second
2.00	0.49	0.14	0.42	0.56	3	second
3.00	0.52	0.21	0.41	0.62	3	second
4.00	0.54	0.36	0.36	0.70	3	second
5.00	0.54	0.51	0.30	0.76	3	second
1.00	0.10	0.22	0.06	0.14	4	second
2.00	0.12	0.14	0.10	0.15	4	second
3.00	0.15	0.21	0.11	0.22	4	second
4.00	0.19	0.36	0.11	0.33	4	second
5.00	0.24	0.51	0.10	0.47	4	second

incidence group	probability	SE	conf.low	conf.high	response.level	wave
2.00	0.44	0.20	0.34	0.53	1	third
3.00	0.45	0.34	0.29	0.62	1	third
2.00	0.05	0.20	0.03	0.07	2	third
3.00	0.05	0.34	0.03	0.09	2	third
2.00	0.40	0.20	0.31	0.50	3	third
3.00	0.39	0.34	0.25	0.56	3	third
2.00	0.11	0.20	0.08	0.16	4	third
3.00	0.11	0.34	0.06	0.19	4	third

Source: Own calculations

APPENDIX

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL CRITERIA

Value	1	2	3	4
Criteria	Decide to act individually, demand less action from federal government	Support individual action of other/ Do not follow joint recommendation	Support jointly made decisions and actions	Ask for more regulation and action from the federal government

Value	1	2	3	4
Criteria	Substantial criticism: Stronger federalism, more independence	Modest criticism: Modest federalism, coordination state level	Modest criticism: Support from/ coordination with federal government	Substantial criticism: Joint decision making and transfer of competences

APPENDIX

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL OLS

OLS SPECIFICATION THREE

	First β (SE)	Second β (SE)	Third β (SE)
(Intercept)	1.5891 (2.0038)	-1.8621 (1.7545)	-3.4987 (3.0699)
sevendayincidence_dev	-0.0173 (0.0073)*	0.0024 (0.0012)*	0.0054 (0.0033)
att_t_fed	-0.0330 (0.7932)	1.9557 (0.7053)**	2.1244 (1.1387)
FKM21	0.0089 (0.0177)	0.0393 (0.0155)*	0.0557 (0.0268)*
fin_att	-0.0003 (0.0074)	-0.0184 (0.0066)**	-0.0204 (0.0103)*
vaccination_rate		-0.1256 (0.0811)	-0.0288 (0.0205)
R ²	0.0329	0.0372	0.0656
Adj. R ²	0.0150	0.0241	0.0405
Num. obs.	221	374	192

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Source: Own calculations

INTERPRETATION

- Results do not contradict the results obtained under the cumulative logit model
- Questionable model fit
- Appropriateness of a linear model is questionable
- Several OLS assumptions are not fulfilled

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